The Kargil war of 1999 stands as a stark reminder of Pakistan’s strategic manoeuvring amid its complex relationship with India. Today is the 25th anniversary of the formal ending of the war; India celebrates it as the Kargil Vijay Diwas (the Day of Kargil Victory) with a series of official functions. This year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi led the nation in saluting the soldiers who ensured victory of the Indian forces.
Rooted in historical precedent and contemporary geopolitical dynamics, Pakistan’s military incursion into the Kargil sector along the Line of Control (LoC) that keeps the two forces on the opposite sides was a military move that underscored a shift in its strategic calculus.
To understand why and how Pakistan decided to invade Kargil, knowing fully well that the Indian forces who left these hilltops during snowy winters would come back, and when they did they would come back hard, it is important to look for the answers to a few questions. We would come to those questions individually broadly later. Let’s first see the context that gave Pakistan the motivation for this foolhardy misadventure.
Shock that wasn’t a total surprise: Historical context and strategic precedent
Historically, Pakistan has employed unconventional warfare tactics during periods of heightened tensions with India. The use of irregular forces and covert operations dates back to the 1947-48 and 1965 India-Pakistan wars, where such tactics were at the core of Pakistan’s planning and pivotal in the initial stages of hostilities.
Barely two months after the Partition of India, creating Pakistan as a separate nation, its Pakistani leadership plotted to surprise Indian forces. Smitten by its infatuation for Kashmir, Pakistan sent its regular forces mixed with tribal militias in October 1947 to Kashmir from the northwest, primarily through the regions of Muzaffarabad and Gilgit. The aim was to capture key areas and create a fait accompli to justify Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan — an ambition denied at Partition.
Again in July-August 1965, Pakistan launched a covert operation named “Operation Gibraltar” to capture Kashmir by inciting a rebellion in the Valley, expecting local support and a rapid collapse of Indian control in the region. But it didn’t get the popular support it had imagined, and India’s response was resolute. The limited incursion turned into a full-scale war in September 1965, forcing Pakistan to come to the negotiating table in Tashkent, where a peace agreement was signed.
These actions were often aimed at gaining strategic leverage before conventional warfare ensued. However, the Kargil incursion marked a departure from this pattern. Unlike previous wars, which saw deteriorating political relations preceding military action, the Kargil operation occurred despite relatively stable diplomatic ties between Islamabad and New Delhi.
Shifting strategies: From proxy warfare to direct infiltration
The Kargil operation represented a strategic evolution of Pakistan’s India policy. It appeared to move beyond its traditional reliance on proxy warfare facilitated by infiltration of mercenaries.
Instead, the intrusion saw the deployment of regular Pakistani military personnel disguised as Mujahideen, a tactic reminiscent of Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan, where military personnel posed as Taliban forces.
This shift underscored Pakistan’s intent to employ a more direct and overt military strategy against India, leveraging the advantageous terrain of Kargil where the Line of Control (LoC) was lightly held due to extreme climatic conditions.
Primary motivations and key considerations
Pakistan’s decision to launch hostilities in Kargil can be attributed to a combination of long-term strategic considerations and immediate domestic political imperatives. Strategically, Pakistan’s military planners viewed the incursion as a means to assert territorial control and disrupt Indian logistical routes, particularly the critical National Highway 1 Alpha that went up to the Siachen Glacier. Pakistan hoped to alter the status quo along the LoC and bolster its position to force a solution in its favour of the Kashmir dispute.
Pakistan has long claimed Kashmir as a territory that should have gone to it at the Partition. Legal records in accordance with the Indian Independence Act of 1947 showed Jammu and Kashmir legally acceded to India after Pakistan invaded the territory then ruled by a king.
The Indian Independence Act was enacted by the UK Parliament that granted freedom to India from 190-year-long British rule and also created Pakistan, a country for Muslims as demanded by the Muslim League — the rival of the Indian National Congress which had led India’s freedom struggle —- and its leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who is now known as the Father of Pakistan. India has always cited legal records to dismiss Pakistan’s claim over Jammu and Kashmir.
However, for Pakistan, Kashmir has been a political bread and butter, and an impossible military dream. Domestically, the Kargil operation served as a distraction from internal governance issues and economic challenges plaguing the Nawaz Sharif administration. With a history of coups, Pakistan’s military saw a window to power under the circumstances.
It is, however, not clear whether Sharif actually had no idea about the Pakistan Army’s Kargil designs. He has maintained this stand in public all these years.Facing criticism and unrest at home, particularly following economic hardships exacerbated by post-nuclear test sanctions, Kargil episode looked like a perfect fit for the government seeking to divert public attention outward, rallying national sentiment behind a perceived external threat. The Pakistani military leadership was ready with the design in any case.
Pakistan’s insecurity syndrome and strategic implications
At its core, Pakistan’s strategic behaviour in Kargil reflected deep-rooted insecurities stemming from its asymmetric power dynamic vis-à-vis India. Pakistan, with its smaller size and population compared to its neighbour, has historically tom-tommed India’s size and military capabilities as existential threats despite the fact that in all wars, provocations have come from Pakistan.
However, this belief of Pakistan has shaped its national security strategy, driving it to adopt measures aimed at maintaining a balance of power through military assertiveness and strategic initiatives.
The introduction of nuclear weapons further complicated this dynamic, providing Pakistan with a perceived deterrent against India’s conventional military superiority while simultaneously raising the stakes in any potential conflict.
This strategic backdrop influenced Pakistan’s decision-making in Kargil, where the deployment of military forces was seen not only as a tactical move but also as a statement of Pakistan’s security concerns and its readiness to defend its perceived interests vigorously.
Now, let’s address the questions we referred to earlier in this piece.
Why Pakistan hoped to get from its Kargil incursion plan?
Why did Pakistan timed the Kargil incursion when it did?
How did the Kargil incursion reflect Pakistan’s strategic posture in South Asia?
What were the implications of the Kargil war for Pakistan in terms of international standing?
And finally, what lessons can be drawn from the Kargil war about South Asian security dynamics?
Pakistan’s military incursion into the Kargil sector, though, marked a strategic shift by the country towards direct military engagement with India and the use of regular armed forces in territories it had eyed for all the decades of its existence, the outcome established India as the leading yet responsible power of South Asia. It also exposed Pakistan at various levels. The absence of coordinated diplomatic efforts exacerbated Pakistan’s isolation on the international stage, highlighting the disconnect between its military strategy and broader diplomatic objectives.
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Why and how Pakistan plotted Kargil invasion, and lost much more than war
